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ABSTRACT 
In his book The Practice of Everyday Life Michel de Certeau makes a distinction between ‘space’ and ‘place’. He 
defines a ‘place’ as: ‘L’ordre (quel qu’il soit) selon lequel des éléments sont distribués dans des rapports de 
coexistence […] Un lieu est donc une configuration instantanée de positions. Il implique une indication de 
stabilité‘2 Whereas ‘space’ is defined as ‘l’effet produit par les opérations qui l’orientent, le circonstancient, le 
temporalisent et l’amènent à fonction en unité polyvalente de programmes conflictuels ou de proximités 
contractuelles […] A la différence du lieu, il n’a donc ni l’univocité ni la stabilité’3
The designer mainly works on the material qualities of the built artefact. When a designer works on the 
composition of the plan, on the distribution and dimension of the different rooms in the building, when he 
invents the structural configuration, when he shapes the façade, opens up the interior of the building or sculpts 
the exterior form of the building; the designer is not – necessarily – involved with politics or with (political) 
ideology. His main interest is the art of building, and for instance not the political question. Thus, the designer 
deals with the notion of ‘place’ as defined by de Certeau, and with the stability or durability that this notion 
implies. Referring to post-war rationalism (of Rossi, Grassi and OM Ungers) and to their idea of the 
architectural type, I argue that this notion of ‘place’ articulates the architect’s autonomous position. The focus 
on the building and other material artefacts such as the urban fabric, the public realm, the appliances and 
furnishings, as well as the scientific study of the qualities of these artefacts, define architecture as a discipline. 
This disciplinary focus positions the designer as an ‘expert’ within the political field.  
 In this paper, I would like to 
use Michel de Certeau’s conceptual apparatus to reflect on the relationship between ‘politics’ and ‘design’.  
By confronting the notion of ‘place’ with the notion of ‘space’, Michel de Certeau opens up this strict 
disciplinary definition of architectural typology. He points on the importance of the architectural event. As such 
he shows the importance of everyday life, of the inhabitants using the built fabric, and of the 
phenomenological ideal of the ‘espace vécu’ – the lived space. The subversive users, ideologically and politically 
reorient the first meaning of the built artefact. Users thus freely reinvent the abstract, geometric space drawn 
down by the architect. In this initial scheme the architect and architectural knowledge by definition are 
ideologically suspect.  
In this paper I want to contest this typical Marxist dialectic. I want to argue that architecture maintains a more 
complex relationship to the ‘programme’ of a building. Some of the provoking thoughts of the rationalist 
architects cited above are used to show how architectural knowledge (and the research based on the idea of 




‘Il existe des genres de discours qui fixent des règles d’enchaînements, et il suffit d’observer pour 
éviter les différends. – Les genres de déterminent les enjeux, ils soumettent des phrases de régimes 
différents à une finalité unique : […]. Il ne s’ensuit pas que les différends entre les phrases soient 




Design (versus) Non-Design  - Diana Agrest 
In an important text from 1974, Agrest used a striking metaphor to describe the relationship 
between politics and the process of designing.5 She made a distinction between Design: the codes, 
the techniques and the means typical of architectural practice; and Non-Design: other, external 
phenomena, such as political ideologies, economic processes, social developments and other cultural 
systems that affect architectural production and thus implicitly affect the designer’s thoughts and 
actions, but that are not considered part of architecture as a discipline.6
According to Diana Agrest, theorists and architects use this distinction very consciously, in order to 
consciously eliminate the external mechanisms affecting building production and consequently, to 
seal off the knowledge constituting the basis of the discipline. ‘Design may be defined as a social 
practice that functions by a set of socially sanctioned rules and norms – whether implicit or explicit – 
and therefore is constituted as an institution.’
  
7
By laconically confronting the cricital discourse of designers such as Alison & Peter Smithson with the 
way in which they try to shape their own way of thinking in architectural projects, however, Diana 
Agrest illustrated that neither the innovation nor the critical thinking are to be found in the 
architectural discipline (Design) itself, but rather seem to originate outside the discipline (Non-
Design). The Smithsons, as members of Team X and thus as critics of the architecture of the 
interbellum period, exposed the ideology which was at the root of the modernist thinking of le 
Corbusier. Diana Agrest seems to be sympathizing with the discourse of the Smithsons. However, 
Agrest’s very neutral comparison of the ‘Golden Lane’ project of Alison and Peter Smithson with le 
Corbusier’s design propositions for the Unités d’Habitation and for the utopian city Cité Radieusse, 
quickly made clear that in essence, these architectural projects are marked by the same spirit. 
Because the architectural partners only reacted to le Corbusier’s formal codes through the language 
of architecture, they did not succeed, according to Agrest, in really formulating a critique with their 
design practice.  
 In this way, design could be described as a closed 
system; not only with regards to culture as a whole, but also in relation to other cultural forms of 
expression, such as politics, literature, painting, philosophy, natural science, geometry etc. Design, 
which can be considered both an action of the designer and the resulting product of the labour of 
designing, is as such marked by a series of conventions. Designs thus are the faithful reproductions of 
a number of rules that are theoretically articulated in advance, for instance because they were 
written down in architectural treatises.  
Therefore, Agrest doubted whether playing with formal architectural codes can really be interpreted 
as a critical practice. She refused to accept that critical practice could only exist if the design is 
exclusively looked at from within the discipline of architecture. By setting limits to the domain of 
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architecture and thus in a way locking it institutionally, the opportunity of renewing the rules and 
scanning the boundaries of the field is ignored. This is why, in the second part of her text, Agrest 
draws attention to the processes that escape from the control of the design and the designer. A truly 
radical design practice, a design practice that moreover has political weight and that propagates 
cultural values, according to Agrest can only originate in contexts where the designer is led by these 
processes: ‘The absence of a normative written discourse in non-design, precludes defining it as an 
institution and makes possible the inscription of sense in a free and highly undetermined way; we are 
here presented with an aleatory play of meaning.’8
Although a lot of observations that lie at the root of Agrest’s analysis are still relevant and her 
conceptual division has proved itself very fruitful for the academic discussion
 These processes on which architecture as a 
discipline has no hold and which Agrest characterized by Non-Design, would give meaning to the 
built space, more than do the internal control mechanisms of design theory, architectural criticism or 
the history of art.  
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, I would like to invert 
the conclusions of her text in this paper. Today, we have reached a point where architecture and 
design are almost completely dominated by procedures outside of the architectural discipline and 
the designer’s control: the spread of the knowledge economy, political-economical globalization, the 
birth of a society of the spectacle… To me, investing in architecture as a knowledge discipline and in 
the history of architecture is the only way to still play a meaningful role as a designer. Specializing in 
certain well-defined issues seems to be the only way to take a political stand today. However, the 
point is not to consider the discipline of architecture as a closed, self-referential system – as has been 
the case under the influence of the (anti-typological) postmodernist debate – but rather to 
investigate how architecture (Design) links up with processes and events outside its domain (Non-
Design); and how a designer can intervene in the political debate (Non-Design) by means of 
architecture (Design).  
(2) 
Places (versus) Spaces  - Michel de Certeau 
In the same year in which Diana Agrest published the text I mentioned earlier, the French historian 
and philosopher Michel de Certeau published his book La culture au Pluriel (1974). In the final piece 
of this essay collection, de Certeau presents an analysis more or less similar to Diana Agrest’s. He 
observed the activities of architects and urban developers as an outsider, and just like Agrest, he 
noticed a discrepancy between the work they do and the processes that eventually affect the 
architecture or the city. 
 [PPT- ‘L’urbaniste est incapable d’articuler cette rationalité en béton sur les systèmes culturels, 
multiples et fluides, qui organisent l’habitation effective des espaces internes (appartements, 
escaliers, etc.) ou externes (rues, places, etc.) et qui les innervent d’itinéraires innombrables. Il pense 
et il fabrique une ville vide; il se retire quand surviennent les habitants, comme devant des sauvages 
qui troubleront les plans élaborés sans eux.’10
In his more theoretical essays, Michel de Certeau also opposed institutions (such as the Church, the 
State, the University); knowledge disciplines (such as grammar, urban development, history); and the 




the control of these institutions, disciplines and experts.11
The oeuvre of Michel de Certeau clearly is indebted to the analysis of Michel Foucault – the 
notorious fellow-historian to whom Michel de Certeau has numerous references.
 He opposed the design practice (‘cette 
rationalité en béton’) against actions and events on which the designer essentially has no grip (‘des 
sauvages qui troubleront les plans élaborés sans eux’). Michel de Certeau’s analysis thus show 
striking similarities to Diana Agrest’s text I have discussed earlier. But in contrast with Agrest, de 
Certeau quite clearly points to a number of unconscious – or uncontrollable – forces. 
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It goes without saying that in de Certeau’s analysis the second term is invariably favoured. With his 
criticism on urban development and the urban developer, he distinguished between what he called 
‘places’ and ‘spaces’. He defined ‘a place’ as : ‘L’ordre (quel qu’il soit) selon lequel des éléments sont 
distribués dans des rapports de coexistence […] Un lieu est donc une configuration instantanée de 
positions. Il implique une indication de stabilité.‘
 But unlike 
Foucault, Michel de Certeau does not in the first place want to tell the story of the Authorities (the 
monarch or other rulers: the Head of the Church, the Researcher, the Expert, etc.), nor does he want 
to tell the story of the producers (the legislator and the grammarians, the architects and urban 
developers, the scientists and technicians); but that of the subordinates: those who consume the 
already produced cultural products. In order to describe the continuous exchange of forces between 
the subordinate and the ruler, de Certeau’s oeuvre is composed by means of pairs of opposites: the 
thing vs. its use, writing vs. reading, hard vs. weak, producer vs. consumer, strategies vs. ideas, 
language (langue) vs. speech (parole), place vs. space, etc. Especially this last pair of opposites – the 
difference between places (‘lieux’) and spaces (‘espaces’) – will require our attention. 
13 A place is invariable. It has a fixed order and has 
more or less permanent characteristics. ‘Le loi du propre y reigne.’14 de Certeau’s definition of space, 
on the other hand, seems to be pointing more in the direction of a performance logic. He defines 
space as ‘l’effet produit par les opérations qui l’orientent, le circonstancient, le temporalisent et 
l’amènent à fonction en unité polyvalente de programmes conflictuels ou de proximités 
contractuelles […] A la différence du lieu, il n’a donc ni l’univocité ni la stabilité’15 Here, de Certeau 
clearly has in mind the occupation of space. With reference to Merleau-Ponty, he confronts the 
geometrical space of the architect with anthropological space (‘Espace Anthropologique’), namely 
space as it is really lived and experienced (‘L’Espace Vécu’).16
The opposition between the two concepts in de Certeau’s text which I have quoted before is clear 
enough. On the one hand, there are the ‘hard’ entities of ‘cet rationalité en béton’: the city, the 
streets, the living towers, the rooms that organize social life, the streets and squares that stage the 
encounters and regulate traffic. On the other, there are ‘weak’ entities: simple, everyday actions 
such as walking, looking, making contact and isolating, sleeping and eating. It is the cultural systems 
(les systèmes culturels, multiples et fluides) that take possession of space and that – according to de 
Certeau – almost elude description. This process perhaps is steered by the plan of the building, but it 
does not let cet rationalité en béton control it. Living practices, observations, memories of a place 
after all cannot be caught in figures or a discourse, de Certeau feels, but rather manifest themselves 
in the stories tied to a specific place, in postures and gestures, in the slow course of time. The 
infrastructure, the facilities and the objects that designers design are not yet the actions the users of 
these things perform. The building is not yet a house and anything but a home. The city which is 
shaped in the drawings and policy documents of the urban developer is not yet the citizen’s city. The 




inhabitants. He works with the dead mass of the empty city: ‘[L’urbaniste, red.] pense et fabrique 
cette ville vide.’17
However, as an outsider, de Certeau, being anything but an architect, to a large extent ignores the 
singularity of the design. Essentially, the design is the moment in which buildings are being invented. 
The time of the designing process is that important period in the existence of a building in which the 
buildings are not yet realized, but still have to be realized. It is the practice in which buildings are 
shaped and in which the city – or better: the urban facts are fabricated. But it is also the period in 
which the things that are usually considered fixed – the materialization, the construction, the 
location of a building and the fixed characteristics of places – momentarily still are subject to change. 
Design practice essentially is a process and an event that does not completely fit into de Certeau’s 
dualistic logic. In the designer’s imagination, an unsteady balance between what exists and what is 
new, between weak and hard, between unconscious motives and conscious intentions, has to be 
sought over and over again. The design is the moment in which places (‘lieux’) briefly become spaces 
(‘espace’), in order to eventually, in the realization of the building, transform into a place again. 
 The subject of architecture is the building, the public space, the city – and 
ultimately not habitation or occupation. In a certain way, the designer always builds in a certain 
distance to the occupation, which is the building’s final destination. 
 
(3) 
Form (versus) Function  - Neo-Rationalism 
A third voice, finally, we encounter in the theoretical writings of writing architects such as Aldo Rossi, 
Giorgio Grassi and Oswald Mathias Ungers. With the rise of the so-called neo-rationalist movement 
in architecture (to which these three designers belong) the debate on the meaning of design practice 
and on the foundations of architecture was renewed. Originally, the discussion was started by a 
group of young architects that gathered in Italy around Ernesto Rogers and the architectural 
magazine Casabella, but relatively quickly, the discussion spread internationally under the influence 
of amongst other things the magazine Oppositions.18
After World War II, architecture was put in the shade and since then, design practice only could 
legitimate itself, or so it seemed, through other disciplines. Talking about architecture was 
politicised, psychologised, anthropologised, economised, historicised; architecture itself, however, 
was hardly ever subject of discussion. Architects such as Aldo Rossi, Girgio Grassi or Oswald Mathias 
Ungers, however, reclaimed attention to architecture proper: to the study of historical buildings, the 
analysis of composition rules, the application of empirical research methods, the history of 
architecture and the métier of building itself.  
  
In the introduction to Architettura della Città, Aldo Rossi distinguishes two methods of researching 
the city and city architecture: ‘In the first, the city is derived from the analysis of the political, social 
and economic system and is approached from the perspective of these disciplines. The second 
perspective is more that of architecture and geography. I start from the second perspective, but also 
take into account the results of the first system.’19 Rossi will ask for attention for the geographic, 
topographic and historical individuality of cities and street patterns. He will stress that the meaning 
of architecture lies in the form and in the architectural elements (the loggias, galleries, towers, 
squares and fountains) that have been handed down to us. Rossi’s typological way of thinking starts 
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from the hypothesis that the meaning of a window, a door, a room, has not really changed. The 
architect is aware that each window, each door, each room he designs is part of architectural history. 
He realizes that in each new window, the meaning of other, older windows, gates and rooms 
resonates. According to Rossi, the point of architecture was to construct new buildings and new 
meaningful contents on the basis of the things that are given: the given topography, the history of 
the city, the instruments of the discipline.  
Giorgio Grassi stressed the nature of architecture as a craft, as a system of rules for the composition 
and ordering of elements; rules that in the course of the discipline’s history had been put to the test 
continuously. On the basis of historical examples of buildings, he stated that the shape of buildings in 
essence has not changed much. Although these buildings once were the expression of a collective 
will, this would have disappeared to a large extent due to modernity and individualization. 
Nevertheless, the architect still could draw on the constructions and methods from the past to shape 
new buildings. Methodological analyses of cities and building typologies prove that essentially, in 
architecture always the same problems are at stake. Because the designer does no longer have to 
take an ideological stance, but – like the modern scientist – merely is a neutral observer, the design 
process could be freed from the will of the designer.20
After Oswald Mathias Ungers, in a lecture in 1963, had portrayed the architect as a nonentity and 
had, in this world of economists, technicians, sociologists and other building specialists, seemingly 
silenced architecture, he stated: ‘Wogegen ich mich aber wehre, ist die Überbewertung dieser 
Faktoren und die daraus resultierende allseitige Zweckerfülling, die zum alleinseligmachenden Inhalt 
des Planens und Bauens erklärt werden soll. Im Grunde is die Zweckgesinnung unarchitektonisch un 
enthält keinen einzigen Bildungsantrieb.’
  
21
The claim that architecture should find its material in itself, thus initially offered the possibility to 
escape from the external influences of sociological concerns, technological developments and 
economic questions. But fighting architectural autonomy had its price, too. Initially, Grassi, Rossi and 
Ungers all dissociated the shape of buildings from their function. In his classes at the University of 
Berlin, Ungers will show that one and the same institutional program (the Museum) can lead to an 
enormous variety of possible architectural shapes. Rossi stated that in a lot of cities large buildings or 
whole complexes of buildings exist that take up a substantial part of the city, but that only rarely 
have preserved their original function. Certain historical squares do no longer function as they once 
did. A lot of buildings have lost their ceremonial and thus representative value. In a number of 
important extracts from Architettura della Città, Aldo Rossi points towards the discrepancy between 
shape and function. In an important paragraph, entitled ‘Critique on naïve functionalism’, that is 
generally read very superficially, the architect expressed it as follows: ‘What I reject is exclusively an 
uncritical notion of functionalism, dictated by a naïve empiricism according to which the functions 
determine the shapes and as such also unequivocally the architecture itself.’
 The problems the economist, the sociologist and the 
technician present us with, are as such not architectural. According to Ungers, the task of the 
architect is to translate the architectural programs in architectural shapes, to shape ideas. The 
problems these specialists point to are very real and have to be taken into account by the designer, 
but they are not part of the discipline.  
22 That is why he 
opposes a building’s architectural shape and its function. According to Rossi, the shape of a building 
is more permanent and has a longer lifespan than the programs inscribed in the buildings.  
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By dissociating the meaning of architecture from its function and therefore from the destination of 
the building like this, the authors were able to focus on architecture proper. The task of the architect 
is now to shape buildings. They (apparently) no longer have to concern themselves with the program, 
the destination and other phenomena affecting architecture. Where Agrest and de Certeau 
minimised the importance of the architectural shape by pointing to the phenomena escaping the 
designer’s control, Rossi, Grassi and Ungers seem to skip that which affects architecture from the 
outside completely in order to fully concentrate on the phenomenon of the city, the buildings and 
the process of building itself. We could even state that these architects remained deaf to political, 
economical and technological questions; or that they simply avoided the question of livableness 
under the veil of architectural autonomy, as a number of ‘critics’ claimed, following in Agrest’s 
footsteps.  
This, however, contradicts with a number of theses of the afore-mentioned architects. ‘Sicherlich 
tauchen bei der Organisation eines Bauwerkes die mannigfaltigsten Probleme auf und ich bestreite 
nicht, daß wirtschaftliche Bedingungen, soziologische Erkenntnisse und konstruktive Forderungen 
berücksichtigt werden müssen. Sie sind reale Faktoren, an die das Bauen gebunden ist.’ And just as 
little as Ungers wanted to ignore the reality of the scientific, sociological or technological 
innovations, do the many notes and asides of Rossi (the theoretician and writer) make clear that 
Rossi (the designer) was not insensible to the phenomenon of living: ‘The housing block of Belo 
Horizonte is full of life and warmth, full of the warmth of life; it repeats the rhythm of baroque 
churches, which is to say, it made the events possible, and that was and still is an aspect of 
architecture: not the beauty, not the mosque of Bursa, where I lost myself, but the continuation of 




The building as pseudo-object  - a situational theory of architectural typology 
The three theoretical frameworks and the pairs of opposites I have discussed, to a certain extent are 
‘arbitrary’, of course. Just as any text or theory trying to subject the design practice to a certain 
system and to fixed rules, they do wrong by the ‘reality’ of designing itself: a practice which, like any 
other practice too – as both Michel de Certeau, Diana Agrest and Stan Allen clearly argument – can 
never be completely described by theoretical models or determined by a strict definition of the 
discipline. The pairs of opposites indeed are arbitrary and the distinctions they make artificial. 
However, they do clarify what is the task of the designer; and in my opinion, they also indicate where 
his responsibility as a designer ends.  
I believe that architecture has a certain autonomy with regards to its means. It is in its means that 
architecture distinguishes itself from other disciplines: the exact and applied sciences, politics, 
economy and history. The building consists of a number of materials and facilities, building elements 
and constructive systems, plan figures and spatial dispositions.  Admittedly, these means can be 
applied with a certain intention, for example to represent a political ideology or to obtain a number 
of economic imperatives, to give a foundation to a certain program or to meet functional 
requirements. But the quality of architecture can only be read from the way in which the 
architectural means ‘work’ and ‘fit’ by themselves. Building elements form a structure. This structure 
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and the building skin define the materiality and the tectonic qualities of buildings. The building takes 
position in the landscape. It determines the environment and sets apart an enclosed area.  
We could say that the drive of architecture ‘stops’ at the control of its means. But this hypothesis – 
which some theoreticians defend in the name of architectural autonomy – poses a problem. When 
we approach the objects and artefacts merely from architecture and from the design, we inevitably 
pass by the possible meanings and the stratifications of the artefact itself, as is clear from the 
following quote from Michel Serres: [ PTT: ‘Je n’ai jamais seul, rapport à un objet. Mon attention, ma 
perception, ma connaissance sont plongées dans un ensemble social et culturel. Une théorie du 
connaître où le sujet, monade, a relation à son objet, passif ou actif, est une utopie vaine. L’objet se 
constitue dans et par les relations du groupe. Le sujet de l’objet, toujours est multiple.’24] As in the 
rest of his oeuvre, Michel Serres shows in this quote that artefacts, actions and social constructions 
never occur in a ‘pure’ state, but are always characterized by ‘mixing’. Objects never exist on their 
own. Things have meaning but to the extent in which they – even if only in the margins – take part in 
our perception. The meanings of objects change according to the situation in which they are 
considered. Naturally, this does not only go for utensils or instruments, but also for architecture and 
buildings; and I again quote from Grassi: ‘The attention is thus drawn to the ties connecting 
architecture with daily practice: for example the ‘institutional’ character of buildings and their 
shapes, as well as the emphasis on the ‘evocative’ character of architecture.’ 25
The architect designs buildings with the help of the means he has at his disposal as an architect. With 
these means, he shapes ideas and expectations one has of the building. Architecture is the result of a 
design process, and is situated between ‘destination’ and ‘occupation’. In the design, a 
transformation takes place: one language (ideas, expectations, visions) is translated into another 
language (space, form, matter), after which the first language becomes meaningful again at the time 
the building is occupied (appropriation, identification).
  
26
By drawing attention to the influence of living and occupation, Michel de Certeau showed that 
buildings stage, frame and organize the events taking place in them. The hole in the wall directs our 
perception. Doors as well as the routes through the building steer our actions and guide our 
behaviour. The dimensions of the space determine how bodies will occupy it and how they will relate 
to one another within that space. The physical boundaries that are set can also become an 
institutional framework, when certain social obligations are projected on the defined space: streets 
guide traffic and are subject to its rules, a school is there for learning, in a museum all work on 
display is ‘Art’. From this point of view, buildings are never merely buildings, artefacts, things, but 
always link up with the institutional regime common to the building, with the bodies occupying the 
buildings, and the institutions claiming the buildings. Moreover, this mixing does not only start with 
the perception of a building after its completion or with the use one makes of a building, but it starts 
already with the ideas, expectations and requirements projected in the building beforehand. Even 
the provisions that preceded the building process are connected to the architectonic question. In 
other words, the architectonic thinking cannot be dissociated from the tissue preceding the 
materiality of the building.  
 In the design, choices are always made that 
permanently define the durable characteristics of the building.  
Buildings are always realized with a meaning, with certain intentions and expectations. These 
intentions are in fact the result of a political will. Therefore, it is quite probable that the realized 
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building represents the political ideals at the base of the design assignment. The meaning of theatre 
architecture, museum architecture, school architecture or prison architecture in the end does not lie 
in the shape of the buildings, but just as much in the way the buildings are the expression of an 
institutional program. Once these buildings have been realized, they are the foundation of the 
activities and events which take place in them. The buildings embody a performance logic or an 
institutional regime.  
A situational theory of architectural typology takes into account the specificity of the architecture (in 
fact, one makes an abstraction of a series of phenomena linked to the building) without limiting 
architectonical thinking solely to its means. Because the design is the expression of specific 
intentions and a preview of the future use, the design question always goes beyond the field in which 
the design itself is active. In this way, every design question is fundamentally entwined with subjects 
that are – strictly spoken – outside its domains. Examples include political issues and political 
ideology, new important social developments or technical inventions, the demands of specific 
institutions occupying the space. But just as much, the design question is interconnected with the 
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